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ABSTRACT
The concept and ideal of statesmanship have been handed down to us from ancient to modern
times, but it has a paradoxical relationship with the modern state. While terminology suggests that
statesmanship presupposes the state, in fact it appears rather incongruent with modern (i.e.,
constitutional, democratic, and bureaucratic) statehood. Nonetheless, statesmanship continues to
be promoted and new understandings, such as judicial and administrative statesmanship, have
been proposed. Some hope, moreover, that statesmanship becomes more feasible again as we
transfer from state government to multilevel governance. There are problems, however, with
conceiving of statesmanship, either in its original or in its newer meanings, under these new
conditions. Despite the enduring appeal of statesmanship, the changing role of the state in present-
day governance does not mean that this ideal can be easily regained.
Introduction
Statesmanship can roughly be defined as morally excellent
leadership at the polity level. Historians, journalists, and
others usually ascribe it ex post to great political figures
who have led their state through times of war and crisis—
men like Lincoln, Churchill, or De Gaulle and, increas-
ingly, women like Thatcher or San Suu Kyi, too.1 It is far
from clear, however, whether the state is the best habitat
for statesmanship. By “state” we here mean a particular
kind of polity, namely, the typically modern regime at the
national level, developing through intertwined processes of
constitutionalization, democratization, and bureaucratiza-
tion. Although this concept of state can be used as a rela-
tively neutral descriptor, the concept of statesmanship is
unavoidably normative, indeed laudatory. And although
the state is a familiar institution in modern times, states-
manship seems much more quaint: to many it sounds not
only unacceptably gender biased (although, as noted, this
might be changing) but also elitist and antiquated. None-
theless, in the public debate calls for statesmanship are fre-
quently heard, especially in times of crisis and constraint,
when social demands are great and trust in government is
low (i.e., when the state is no longer relied on).2 And aca-
demically, in a time when principle-based ideal theory and
institutional analyses dominate political science, there is
also a felt need to bring back attention to individual politi-
cal agency.3 So there are both practical and intellectual rea-
sons to reconsider statesmanship and its relation to the
modern state and to assess the chances for statesmanship
under current conditions.
Our goal here is not to determine which leaders should
be called statesmen or not (which would result in endless
quibbles about particular cases) but rather, to improve our
understanding of statesmanship as such. As Jacobsohn has
put it: “Perhaps it is less important to evaluate the states-
manship of [X] than that we understand the criteria accord-
ing to which such evaluations are made.”4 To achieve this
goal, we offer, first, a concise elaboration of the concept of
statesmanship as it has been handed down to us from
ancient and modern thought. Next, we argue why, contrary
to appearances, the modern state is inhospitable to states-
manship. Thenwe show that new concepts of statesmanship
have appeared lately. Hopes that the ideal and practice of
statesmanship can be reinvigorated seem bound to be disap-
pointed, however, because statesmanship fares no less badly
in contemporary governance than in modern government.
Our sobering conclusion is that, with mounting pressures
on the state, statesmanship may become more needed, but
not more feasible. This is not to deny that, incidentally,
statesmenmay still arise; we only claim the structural condi-
tions for such occurrences are not improving.
Statesmanship: A Conceptual Exploration
President Truman once reputedly quipped that “[a]
statesman is a politician who has been dead 10 or
15 years,” but this is surely too cynical, if only because
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the vast majority of long-dead politicians never gains the
epithet. Dannhauser therefore rightly qualifies: “A states-
man is (…) not simply a politician, but an extraordinary
politician who exercises wise leadership.”5 This also
seems not precise enough, however, for statesmanship is
not just wise leadership but wise leadership of a special
kind. To get a clearer understanding of the concept, we
propose to use a conceptual framework developed by
Coats.6 His definition harks back to that of the ancients,
in particular Aristotle:
In its purest sense, [statesmanship] equates to the idea of
political rule, where ‘political’ is understood to mean a
comprehensive or ‘architectonic’ perspective focused on
molding character and leading fellow citizens through a
stream of contingencies, within the context of funda-
mental laws (a constitution), and through primary reli-
ance on a mix of persuasion and coercion called
‘politics.’7
Statesmanship, thus, is not just playing the game of
politics well but making that very game possible. In the
words of Coats again, it is “an activity directed toward
securing the conditions for politics to occur, as the basis
for agreement about general courses of action, and for
moderate reconciliation of differences among fellow
citizens.”8
Since Plato’s fascinating late dialogue Politikos,9 the
concept of statesmanship has gone through various mod-
ifications. Coats describes its development from ancient
to modern understandings, arguing that Aristotle and
Cicero depicted statesmanship as an “architectonic”
activity, a “general or comprehensive art” concerned
with the development of all other arts in society, which,
although “exercised over those who are free and equal”
and for their good, undeniably had a strongly aristocratic
character.10 In modern times, however, challenges posed
to this classical ideal first by Christianity and then by lib-
eralism led to its gradual democratization. Through the
influence of modern political thought from Machiavelli
onward, statesmanship, while retaining its laudatory
connotations, acquired additional overtones of political
realism. This is the sense in which, for example, Bis-
marck has often been called a statesman.11 Thus, we
have ended up with an intricate concept in which ancient
and modern, Christian and secular layers of meaning can
all be traced.
Traditionally, statesmanship is said to be shown at
two moments in particular, namely, at the constitutional
(re)founding of a polity and in times of war and crisis—
two moments, that is, in which the state cannot be taken
for granted.12 Apparently, statesmanship particularly
occurs in the face of great difficulties. In the words of
Dannhauser: “Difficulty is thus of the very essence of
statesmanship. (…) A statesman’s vocation necessarily
involves the surmounting of obstacles….”13 Or, as Tulis
puts it: “Statesmanship most clearly reveals itself in times
of political crisis. It is hard to think of well-known states-
men whose reputations were not the product of excep-
tional political circumstances.”14 Others, however, think
statesmanship is also conceivable in quieter times. Coats,
for one, says there are “two functions of statesmanship,
that is, one concerned with getting constitutional
arrangements in place, and the other with employing
them to deal with the daily stream of contingencies facing
a body politic.”15
As Coats further points out, statesmanship should be
discerned “from other forms of rule, such as mastery,
domination, and ‘management.’”16 It is unique in three
crucial respects:
This art or activity [of statesmanship], then, is distin-
guished by its aim (achieving the general good in meet-
ing a stream of contingencies), its scope (the major
activities in the life of a people), and its means (political,
i.e., a blend of persuasion and coercion within the frame-
work of fundamental laws, reflecting prudent
judgment).17
So, concretely, a tyrant can have great leadership
skills, but never be a statesman insofar as he does not
aim at the common good (or, in modern terms, the gen-
eral interest), but only at a very partial one (aim). The
director of a public agency, next, differs from a statesman
insofar as he deals only with his organization and its
direct environment and not with the broad interests of
the political community at large (scope). And a military
commander, finally, cannot be a statesman insofar as his
form of rule depends on physical force rather than on
politics (means).18
This conceptualization seems useful for analyzing
statesmanship but also has its limitations. One is a limi-
tation in time period, to be discussed later. Another is
that the aspects of aim, scope, and means, although help-
ful for discerning statesmanship from other forms of
rule, say little about the character of the statesman. In
most ancient and modern conceptualizations, the states-
man is claimed (rightly or not) to possess important
political virtues; statesmanship is inherently aretaic.
Statesmen distinguish themselves from “ordinary” lead-
ers not only by their political contributions to the widest
possible common good but also by their moral excel-
lence.19 Many virtues have been deemed important here,
including, of course, the cardinal virtues. Thus, Nicgorski
calls prudence “the central and most important virtue of
[Cicero’s] model statesman,”20 while Ruderman says that
“statesmanship is essentially the art of moderation, of
keeping an oft-times rattled humanity from seeking (…)
the (false) comfort of various extremes.”21 It is easy to
imagine how courage and justice are also crucial to
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statesmanship. On a somewhat different note, the Aristo-
telian virtue of magnanimity has traditionally been
strongly associated with statesmanship.22 Truly great
statesmen, such as Churchill, show a kind of chivalry
toward, even compassion with their enemies, that distin-
guishes them from other, less virtuous political leaders.23
These virtues are not only latent traits of personal char-
acter but they are shown in very concrete practical abili-
ties, for instance, in the statesman’s well-developed
capacity of timing, of grasping the right moment (the
kairos), in handling public problems.24 Without delving
further into debates on the statesman’s particular virtues,
we suggest that, to give the concept of statesmanship
additional content, this aspect should be added to Coats’s
original three.
Statesmanship and the State
Having acquired a clearer understanding of statesman-
ship, we can now see how it does or does not fit the state.
Terminologically, of course, “statesmanship” and “state”
are tightly connected, with the former implying the lat-
ter. Their relationship is much more paradoxical, how-
ever, than this simple relation suggests. Indeed, we argue
the modern state stifles rather than promotes the oppor-
tunity for statesmanship. A high degree of “stateness”
will prevent statesmanship from emerging.
In the canonical Weberian understanding, the state is
a regime primarily organized at the nation-state level,
wielding the monopoly of violence. The modern state,
moreover, has three basic characteristics or aspirations,
namely, constitutionalism, (representative) democracy,
and bureaucracy. Differences between states can often be
understood as variations in the mixture of these ele-
ments. Crucially, each of them tends to limit the scope
for statesmanship.
To begin, constitutionalism (i.e., the legitimation and
limitation of government power by legal right) seems dif-
ficult to combine with statesmanship. Statesmen are by
definition extraordinary, operating beyond established
orders, and therefore even dangerous. Tulis states: “True
statesmanship lives in a space outside of any constitu-
tional order and would be a threat to constitutionalism
or at least to many particular constitutional orders if we
actually tried to nourish its possibility.”25 Therefore, he
adds, the attractive notion of “constitutional statesman-
ship is a contradiction in terms. Constitutionalism was
invented to replace statesmanship in the old capacious
sense of law giving and polity making.”26 The American
Founders, for instance, believed it was necessary to resort
to constitutionalism instead of statesmanship as a reli-
able source of political order. Madison famously wrote in
Federalist number 10: “It is in vain to say that
enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clash-
ing interests and render them all subservient to the pub-
lic good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the
helm.”27 Hence, constitutionalists typically prefer struc-
tures with checks and balances over individual political
agency: “The system of institutionally constructed per-
sonas put in conflict and dialogue is a substitute for
statesmanship in the day-to-day-business of govern-
ment.”28 Ultimately, constitutionalism intends to make
statesmanship superfluous—at least as long as the consti-
tutional order remains intact and the state is in place. It
installs, in the old saying, “a government of law, not of
men.”
Modern states also are, aspire to become, or pretend
to be democratic. The compatibility of democracy and
statesmanship is, however, highly debatable, too.29 Max
Weber, for one, was quite pessimistic about the prospects
for statesmanship in democratic regimes.30 One reason
for skepticism is that the ideal of statesmanship is neces-
sarily elitist; democratic egalitarianism stands in the way
of greatness.31 Statesmanship presupposes qualitative
differences between people: some people are, because of
their wisdom and virtue, more suited for political leader-
ship than others. Another major obstacle is the partisan
character of modern democratic politics, which forces
politicians to serve particular interests rather than the
common good. As Mansfield has shown, partisanship
and statesmanship do not go well together: when
Edmund Burke rhetorically laid the intellectual founda-
tion of modern party government, this was an act of
statesmanship, but paradoxically also one that aimed
(and succeeded) “to reduce dependence upon statesman-
ship” thereafter.32 So statesmanship seems hard to com-
bine with basic democratic characteristics. Of course,
concepts of “democratic statesmanship” have been devel-
oped, not least under the influence of Tocqueville,33 but
they do disappointingly little to clarify how the inevitable
tensions between democracy and statesmanship can be
resolved.
Finally, modern states have become so strongly
bureaucratic that they can be aptly called “administrative
states.”34 How does this affect statesmanship? On the
optimistic side, Hegel believed that bureaucrats could
run the state as an elite of officials or “universal estate.”35
Even for him, however, these officials hardly figure as
statesmen. The only figures worthy of the name, in
Hegel’s thought, are “world-historical individuals” like
Alexander the Great and Napoleon, but tellingly they are
no longer needed once the rational state has been estab-
lished.36 So while at first glance statesmanship might
seem to come natural to bureaucrats, on closer inspec-
tion, the reverse turns out to be true. That other great
theorist of bureaucracy, Max Weber, was also very
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pessimistic. His hallowed ideal of the charismatic politi-
cal leader had the very role to counteract the rising influ-
ence of the bureaucracy. Weber’s Politik als Beruf can be
read as a vivid portrait of this type of politician in con-
trast with the administrative official and makes it very
clear that leadership, let alone statesmanship, was not to
be expected from bureaucrats.37 But the charismatic poli-
tician is not suited to act as a real statesman either,
because he lacks both the necessary stance “above the
parties” and the required long-term focus and moral vir-
tues.38 It seems safe to say, therefore, that, as Strong put
it, “statesmen will be harder to find in an increasingly
bureaucratized world.”39 In similar vein, Henry Kis-
singer, a reflective practitioner who wrote much about
statesmanship, especially in his dissertation A World
Restored, has sharply contrasted the “inspiration” offered
by statesmanship with the “organization” characterizing
bureaucracy.40
So instead of presupposing the modern state, states-
manship rather appears at odds with it. Bluntly put,
statehood stifles rather than promotes statesmanship. If
this is true, one might hypothesize that, reversely, states-
manship could become increasingly possible again when
modern statehood declines. Given the development of
present-day governance, is ours perhaps a time of new
chances for statesmanship? One would be inclined to
think so, considering the new concepts of statesmanship
that have recently been proposed.
Statesmanship New Style
If ancient and modern concepts of statesmanship can be
called its first and second generations, our time sees the
emergence of new offspring in unexpected places. In
the earlier conceptualizations, statesmanship was
assumed to be performed exclusively by regime found-
ers, heads of state or government, and other high-
ranking political leaders—never by less prominent
public officials. This has changed, however, as states-
manship has increasingly been ascribed to other figures
as well, such as high-level judges, public servants, and
military. The concept’s applicability has indeed been
widened so much that virtually all kinds of public
authorities (think also of diplomats, central bankers,
and regulators) can now be praised as statesmen— pro-
vided they deal with high interests of the state, tran-
scend partisanship, and aim at the common good. With
this transition from “old” to “new” statesmanship, as
Storing called it,41 the epithet of statesmanship is
applied to a much wider set of public officials than
before. The literature especially contains endorsements
of judicial and administrative statesmanship.
Judicial statesmanship is shown by high-level judges
on the bench, especially in constitutional courts. The
idea was known to Tocqueville already: “Federal judges
(…) must not only be good citizens, educated and
upright men—qualities necessary to all magistrates—one
must also find statesmen in them….”42 More recently,
Siegel has given a particularly extended treatment and
defense of the idea:
Statesmanship charges judges with approaching cases so
as to facilitate the capacity of the legal system to legiti-
mate itself by accomplishing two paradoxically related
preconditions and purposes of law: expressing social val-
ues as social circumstances change and sustaining social
solidarity amidst reasonable, irreconcilable disagree-
ment. I argue that judicial statesmanship is a necessary,
although not sufficient, component of judicial role in the
American constitutional order.43
Although sometimes criticized on prudential and
principled grounds,44 several constitutional scholars
have embraced judicial statesmanship as a necessary fea-
ture of liberal democracy.45 Combining knowledge of the
law with political insight and moral respectability, they
suggest, judicial statesmen must sometimes appeal to
unwritten constitutional principles precisely to sustain
what has been written down in the Constitution. This
contribution cannot be replaced by mechanical following
of the rules without an understanding the deeper mean-
ing of a constitution for the polity.
Administrative statesmanship is an even older and
more widespread concept. In 1836 Henry Taylor pub-
lished a book about the British civil servant which he
titled, with unmistakable reference to Plato, The States-
man.46 Later, others have called civil servants “statesmen
in disguise.”47 The inventor of the literal phrase “admin-
istrative statesmanship,” however, seems to be John
Dewey, who used it in 1935 in a short paper on public
school administration.48 Although nicely summarizing
Dewey’s educational ideas, his article does little to pro-
vide a helpful conceptualization of administrative states-
manship. The concept has remained in use, however,
and after a re-launch by Storing, it has found many
adopters, especially within the “Constitutional School” in
the field of public administration.49 In that literature, the
concept of administrative statesmanship refers to the
promotion of “regime values” by public servants to
uphold the constitutional order (particularly, the balance
of powers) through legitimate, discretionary action.50
This is indeed a huge responsibility: “The task of the
administrator is to be aware of the moral underpinnings
of the Constitution not only to promote its values but to
correct its excesses as well.”51 In this usage the concept is
often used polemically against those who reduce public
administration to technocratic management. Thus, for
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instance, by Selznick who, in the closing sentence of his
Leadership in Administration, summarized his argument
as follows: “The executive becomes a statesman as he
makes the transition from administrative management
to institutional leadership.”52
The literature on these new kinds of statesmanship is
mostly theoretical and exhortative and hardly concerned
with concrete examples. Some cases of judicial53 and admin-
istrative statesmanship54 have been described, however, and
many more examples of such “extra-political” and “sub-
political” statesmanship could be imagined.
An Expanded Conceptual Framework
Considering these recent conceptualizations, we can now
see why Coats’s framework was not only limited in con-
tent (lacking the aspect of virtues) but also in time.
Besides what he called “ancient” and “modern” states-
manship, newer conceptions have emerged that he did
not include and that we could name, with Storing, “new”
statesmanship. Hence, we arrive at an expanded categori-
zation of three concepts of statesmanship (see Table 1).
The aim of statesmen remains, of course, to promote
the widest possible common good55—or, in contempo-
rary parlance, the general interest. This ultimately con-
servative goal to preserve the common good of one’s
own polity while developing its good relations with other
polities is what, according to Kissinger, distinguishes the
statesman (Metternich) from the revolutionary—
whether he is a “conqueror” who mainly relies on mili-
tary prowess (Napoleon) or a “prophet” who prefers
standing aloof on the moral high ground (Czar
Alexander).56 This aim remains crucial to all kinds of
statesmanship, including those of the third generation.
To qualify for statesmanship, officials who are not politi-
cians will also have to help keep their polity afloat and
steer it safely. Coats’s definition of this aim as the
upholding of the constitution to make politics possible
also applies to them. When, for instance, the U.S.
Supreme Court decided on the stalled 2000 presidential
race between Bush and Gore, it did exactly that:
irrespective of the side it chose, by cutting the knot it
made the continuation of American politics possible.
As to scope, second, things are more subject to change.
In practice, judges and administrators are mostly not
directly concerned with the survival and well-being of
the polity as a whole; their decisions usually concern a
narrower interest. This is highlighted by Selznick in the
opening sentence of his aforementioned classic, when he
notes that besides a focus on “political statesmen, leaders
of whole communities who sit in the high places where
great issues are joined and settled” now “an additional
emphasis is necessary” on the leadership of more or less
autonomous groups and organizations within society.57
Here statesmanship is shown by actors who are responsi-
ble for only a part of the polity. Increasingly, however,
one could also imagine “new statesmen” dealing with
interests of collectives larger than one body politic. Offi-
cials negotiating international treaties on climate change
or free trade, for example, can show “statesmanship”
within a scope that goes beyond the nation-state. Thus, it
seems that in third-generation statesmanship, the scope
is no longer fixed to one particular size (whether it is the
polis, the empire, or the nation-state) but varies with the
size of the relevant governance level. Still, these “new
statesmen” do serve the general interest of large rather
than small communities.
The means, third, that “new statesmen” employ also
in part differ from those used by first- and second-gener-
ation statesmen. Coats is very succinct in describing the
means employed by ancient and modern statesmen, but
he suggests that both types of political leaders make use
of public rhetoric and high-level negotiations. Such
means are typically less available to judges and civil serv-
ants. Behind the scenes, they do of course use argumen-
tation, negotiation, and decision making, too, but always
less publicly and less politically. So, they seem to employ
comparable means in a different manner.
Last but not least, what would be the proper vir-
tues of contemporary statesmen? The literature on
judicial and administrative statesmanship says very
little about the (compositions of) virtues characteristi-
cally shown by the “new statesmen.” It seems clear,
however, that their virtues have to be at least partially
different from those of more traditional statesmen. It
is difficult to conceive, for instance, how they can
exemplify Aristotelian magnanimity in their “dis-
guised” roles. And undoubtedly, both judges and civil
servants, more than politicians, have to complement
their statesmanship with craftsmanship, combining
moral virtue with skilled professionalism.58 To com-
plicate matters further, judicial statesmanship may
require other virtues than administrative statesman-
ship. And different statesmen in different situations
Table 1. Three concepts of statesmanship.
1. Pre-modern 2. Modern 3. “New”
Aim Common good Public interest General interest



















Shaded area: the framework developed by Coats (1995).
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may excel in different virtues. Just as the transition
from ancient to modern statesmanship implied
changes in moral orientation, so will the further shift
toward these new forms of statesmanship.
New Statesmanship beyond the State?
Today, reflections on the compatibility of statesman-
ship with the modern, Weberian state may seem to
belong to a bygone era, as many political theorists
have noted a transition from a relatively coherent sys-
tem of state-centric government to more diffuse, hori-
zontal, multilevel networks of governance.59 This
process, if and to the extent it does indeed happen,
affects all three characteristics of the modern state
identified before. Constitutionalism, first, seems to be
undermined, as limited government is replaced by
unlimited governance and checks and balances by
utilitarian coordination. Representative democracy,
second, gradually gives way to diffuse forms of tech-
nocratic governance in which equal representation
cannot be guaranteed. And bureaucracy, finally, devel-
ops into “network governance,” public-private part-
nerships, and other loose forms of cooperation. These
very general trends might imply that the conditions
for statesmanship in present-day governance deterio-
rate further, because the character of the public inter-
est becomes less clear and individual action less
decisive than before. They might, however, also work
reversely. If statehood is indeed disappearing or at
least waning, the scope for statesmanship or states-
manlike behavior may increase again. Has not states-
manship always been shown precisely when the role
of the state could not be taken for granted? So if we
move towards governance without strong statehood,
do the conditions for statesmanship become less or
rather more favorable?
It may be too early to give a conclusive answer, but a
good case to illustrate the complexity of this puzzle is
Europe. So far, most literature about traditional states-
manship is American,60 but for studying new statesman-
ship Europe seems a much better case. The European
Union (EU), in particular, is the prime example of a mul-
tilevel governance system.61 It is a composition of vari-
ous overlapping economic, administrative, and legal
arrangements, an emerging federal polity perhaps, but
one in which nation-states still play a key role. Moreover,
this polity is currently constitutionalizing itself—a pro-
cess that might ultimately worsen the conditions for
statesmanship but that can also (like every founding)
offer great chances for statesmanship in the short run.
And while the EU’s complex structure and its highly
bureaucratic and judicial character seem to limit the
possibility for traditional statesmanship, this is not nec-
essarily the case for newer forms of statesmanship. (Per-
haps Jacques Delors, architect of the monetary and
political union, qualifies as an administrative statesman
of this non-state?)
We are, however, not too optimistic about the com-
patibility of statesmanship and contemporary gover-
nance. The continuing crisis of the EU illustrates that
statesmanship cannot thrive in an amorphous regulatory
regime but needs to be embedded within concrete politi-
cal communities. As long as the EU tries to remain a
“democracy without nations”62 and cannot develop itself
into a federal republic of the kind the American Found-
ers have managed to erect, potential statesmen will con-
tinue to emerge (if at all) from the nation-states. The EU
will then be only a platform on which they can try to
achieve peaceful cooperation. If, however, the role of the
state is indeed changing as fundamentally as governance
theorists claim, statesmanship at the transnational level
may be in higher demand, but that in itself does not
guarantee it will also emerge. When policies are increas-
ingly made in multilevel governance networks, it rather
seems difficult for individuals to play a decisive role. In
networks, there is typically little integration and hierar-
chical organization. With the state no longer playing a
central role, authority becomes scattered. This could give
leaders more discretion and thus on first sight greater
possibilities to act as statesmen, but at the same time
they lose their ability to mobilize resources. If the mod-
ern administrative state was too structured for potential
statesmen to act, present-day governance has become
too unstructured for them to make an impact.63 Of
course, the possibility remains that, unexpectedly, a crisis
within the present “system” of governance networks
gives rise to brilliant instances of statesmanship—just as
when dramatic breakdowns of the state system brought
forward a Metternich, Lincoln, Churchill, or De Gaulle.64
These men were, however, genuine political leaders;
while their states were endangered, they kept a vivid con-
ception of the common good, both of their own polities
and of the wider world. Whether from the ruins of tech-
nocratic governance networks similar figures can appear
remains doubtful.
Statesmanship without Statesmen?
Our argument so far has yielded a series of counterintui-
tive conclusions: statesmanship does not presuppose the
state, the modern state makes statesmanship difficult,
and yet a decline of statehood is no guarantee for states-
manship to reemerge. This raises the question whether
statesmanship is still a relevant ideal. Some theorists
believe or perhaps rather hope that statesmanship,
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though badly suited for nineteenth- and twentieth-cen-
tury government, again becomes increasingly meaningful
for twenty-first-century governance. Ruderman, for one,
maintains its continued relevance:
Balancing between conserving and innovating, between
deferring to public sentiment and attempting to educate
it, and perhaps most importantly, between taking moral-
ity seriously while recognizing its limited applicability in
certain political situations, statesmanship remains an
essential yet difficult to prescribe art.65
There are, however, several problems with deliberate
attempts to resuscitating statesmanship as such. For one
thing, in every manifestation of statesmanship there is
undoubtedly a great deal of contingency—of fortuna
next to virtu, in Machiavelli’s terms. Instances of states-
manship are to a large extent lucky coincidences, a fortu-
nate combination of virtue and wisdom in the right
person at the right place and time. That is why true
statesmanship has often been regarded as a gift of the
gods (“charisma”) or of nature.66 Moreover, pleas for
statesmanship can be exaggerated and ultimately perni-
cious. Calling all public officials potential “statesmen” is
an overstatement that threatens to erode the meaning of
statesmanship as an ideal. Particularly sub-political
actors like civil servants, but also extra-political actors
like judges, should perhaps not aspire to be statesmen
themselves, but rather recognize and promote the true
statesmanship of political leaders.67
Contemporary governance surely aggravates the need
for all kinds of public officials to act in a statesmanlike
manner. This means they should show moral excellence
in aspiring to achieve the general interest of their entire
community. The size of this community may no longer
be fixed to the nation-state but vary with that of the rele-
vant networks. Hence, the very term “statesmanship”
seems less and less fitting. Tulis has proposed to speak of
constitutional officers rather than statesmen.68 Accord-
ing to him, even the American President (but this cer-
tainly goes for others, too) can no longer be a true
statesman, establishing a constitutional order, but only a
constitutional officer, working within and in service of
such an order: “A constitutional officer is neither a leader
nor a statesman but rather something in between.”69
Tulis models this notion after that of the Roman consti-
tutional dictator, who worked within constitutional con-
fines even in times of high emergency.70 This notion of
“constitutional officer” could apply not only to a presi-
dent or (prime) minister but also to a judge, diplomat,
administrator, or other public official with greater ease
than that of “statesman.”
Regardless of terminology, the practice of statesman-
ship is still strongly desired. Perhaps, we should therefore
adopt the useful distinction between “being a statesman”
and “performing acts of statesmanship.” Green noted:
“We needn’t require officials to be statesmen. The quali-
ties of statesmen are too rare and their powers too awe-
some. However, we do want officials to perform
occasional acts of statesmanship that remind us of the
wisdom of our governing system.”71 Or, as Dannhauser
put it: “Statesmanship is not as rare as statesmen,
because on occasion quite ordinary men are capable of
the extraordinary deeds we designate as acts of states-
manship, but it is rare enough.”72 In our century, public
officials still and perhaps increasingly need to show
moral excellence (virtue) while acting with nonviolent
ways (means) for the general interest (aim) of the widest
possible political community (scope). With the modern
state and its institutions under increased pressure, the
moral fiber of public officials is becoming particularly
important again. The often-announced “waning of the
state”73 does, however, not by itself imply a bright future
for statesmanship. Would true statesmen emerge (a pos-
sibility that, fortunately, can never be ruled out), it will
be despite modern statehood and governance rather
than because of them.
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